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 Life is but a bundled discount.  From fast food value meals to cable packages, 
bundled discounts permeate nearly every facet of consumer consumption up and 
down the distribution chain.1  Bundled discounting is the practice of selling a group 
or collection of products at a price that is less than the total price for which the prod-
ucts are sold separately.2  At first blush, bundled discounts appear to embrace the 
values of antitrust law by enhancing competition3 and benefiting the consumer by 
making products available at a lower price.4  However, bundled discounts also have 
the potential to be anticompetitive and cause harm.5  Courts have only recently, with 
any regularity, addressed the legality of bundled discounts and attempted to create a 
workable legal test to determine whether bundling violates antitrust laws.6
 In Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, the Ninth Circuit addressed whether a 
hospital’s deep discounts to insurers for making it their sole preferred provider for all 
hospital care services constituted anticompetitive behavior in violation of section 2 of 
the Sherman Antitrust Act (“Sherman Act”).7  Defendant PeaceHealth allegedly 
used its monopoly market power8 in tertiary care services to squeeze out competition 
1. See Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 502 F.3d 895, 905 (9th Cir. 2007) (providing a list of 
examples of common bundled discounts and noting that bundled discounts are a pervasive pricing 
strategy used by a wide range of entities from large corporations involved in various industries to food-
cart street vendors).
2. Id.
3. See Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 920 F.Supp. 455, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“Price 
cutting is a classic, and a socially desirable, form of competition.”).
4. Thomas A. Lambert, Evaluating Bundled Discounts, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 1688, 1698 (2005) (“[B]undled 
discounts are, first and foremost, discounts.  They always benefit consumers in the short term.”). 
Usually, lower prices are a valued byproduct of competitive behavior.  Id. at 1726 (noting that bundled 
discounts drive prices closer to actual costs, which is where prices would be if there were perfect 
competition).  However, the short term lowering of prices is not the objective of competition laws.  See 
Cascade Health Solutions, 502 F.3d at 912–13.  But cf. id. at 906 (“[B]ecause of the benefits that f low to 
consumers from discounted prices, price cutting is a practice the antitrust laws aim to promote.” (citing 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986))).
5. Cascade Health Solutions, 502 F.3d at 906 (“[I]t is possible, at least in theory, for a firm to use a bundled 
discount to exclude an equally or more efficient competitor and thereby reduce consumer welfare in the 
long run.”); see also infra p. 342 and note 63 for a discussion and examples of how above-cost pricing can 
be harmful.
6. See Cascade Health Solutions, 502 F.3d at 918–19 (noting that the judiciary has limited experience with 
bundled discounts); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 12 n.9, 
LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003) (No. 02-1865) (providing general outline of judicial 
history of bundled discounts and related practices); Daniel A. Crane, Mixed Bundling, Profit Sacrifice, 
and Consumer Welfare, 55 Emory L.J. 423, 425 n.4 (2006) (providing a list of recent cases and cases 
pending before various courts).
7. See Cascade Health Solutions, 502 F.3d at 904–05.
8. Monopoly market power alone is not per se unlawful.  See U.S. v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 
(1966) (noting that monopoly power, without willful acquisition or maintenance of that power, is not 
necessarily unlawful); LePage’s, Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 148 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that, as applicable 
to the Sherman Act, it has long been accepted that a company with a monopoly need not necessarily 
have monopolized the market); Masimo Corp. v. Tyco Health Care Group, L.P., No. CV 02-4770, 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29977, at *30 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2006) (“The possession of monopoly power 
in and of itself does not amount to a section 2 violation; the monopoly power must be maintained 
unlawfully.”).
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in primary and secondary care services.9  The court held that bundled discounting is 
not an exclusionary practice in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act unless the 
discounts result in prices below an appropriate measure of the discounter’s cost.10 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits an attempt “to monopolize any part of the 
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations.”11  To establish 
an attempt to monopolize claim, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving, “that the 
defendant has engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct.”12  In determining 
whether bundled discounting is anticompetitive, courts have applied either a cost-
based analysis or a market-based analysis.  A cost-based analysis focuses on the 
discounter’s package pricing relative to production costs.  The market-based ap-
proach, on the other hand, focuses less on the discounter’s individual pricing schemes 
and instead focuses on the structure of the relevant product market and the com-
petitors in that market.
 This case comment contends that, while the court correctly noted that a market-
based test which finds bundled discounts presumptively illegal is too broad, so too is 
the cost-based discount attribution standard adopted by the Ninth Circuit.  Instead 
of applying a broad test, courts would be better served by adopting a cautious ap-
proach to assessing liability, and should apply a test that presumes bundled discounts 
are lawful.  A cautious approach prevents the unnecessary chilling of competitive 
behavior while still actively monitoring and preventing anticompetitive behavior.13
 Cascade Health Solutions (f/k/a McKenzie-Willamette Hospital (“McKenzie”))14 
and PeaceHealth are the only two providers of hospital services in Lane County, 
9. See Cascade Health Solutions, 502 F.3d 895.
10. Id. at 913–14.  Because a bundled discounter may force an efficient competitor from the market without 
pricing the individual products in the bundle or the bundle as a whole below the cost, determining the 
“appropriate measure” of cost is difficult.  Id. at 914.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
12. Cascade Health Solutions, 502 F.3d at 904 (quoting Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 
456 (1993)).  Engaging in anticompetitive conduct has the tendency to impede rivals because the 
defendant is not engaging in competition on its merits or is engaging in conduct more restrictive than 
necessary.  Id. (citing Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 n.32 
(1985)).
13. Cascade Health Solutions, 502 F.3d at 913 (“[T]he mechanism by which a firm engages in predatory 
pricing—lowering prices—is the same mechanism by which a firm stimulates competition, and 
therefore, mistaken findings of liability would chill the very conduct antitrust laws are designed to 
protect.” (quoting Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1069, 
1075 (2007))); see also id. at 915 (noting that in developing a rule, a balance should be sought between a 
test that identifies anticompetitive behavior and results in minimal harm to competition); Crane, supra 
note 6, at 427–28 (noting that courts initially imposed “draconian liability” on tying behavior that was 
usually benign, and they should learn from past mistakes and begin all Sherman Act analysis with an 
“inquiry into the reasons firms engage in that conduct”).
14. Subsequent to the initiation of this litigation, McKenzie-Willamette Hospital merged with Triad 
Hospitals, Inc. in an effort to stymie financial losses and add tertiary care services to its product mix. 
As a result of this merger, McKenzie’s name changed to Cascade Health Solutions.  Cascade Health 
Solutions, 502 F.3d at 902 & n.1.
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Oregon.15  McKenzie operates one 114-bed hospital and offers only primary and 
secondary acute care hospital services (“ACHS”).16  In contrast, PeaceHealth oper-
ates three hospitals, the largest of which is a 432-bed facility offering primary, 
secondary, and tertiary ACHS.17  While PeaceHealth has only 75% of the market 
share for primary and secondary ACHS, it has 90% of the market share for tertiary 
neonatal services and 93% of the market share for tertiary cardiovascular services.18
 In the hospital services market, the primary consumers are the insurance compa-
nies that purchase health services from hospitals at a designated fee on behalf of their 
insured.19  The relationship between the insurance companies and hospitals is usu-
ally a contractual arrangement in which the parties agree on a reimbursement rate 
(i.e., a percentage discount from the hospital’s regular service rates).20  In 2001, 
PeaceHealth was the sole preferred provider under several insurance companies’ pre-
ferred provider plans (“PPPs”), including Regence Blue Cross Blue Shield 
(“Regence”).21  PeaceHealth offered Regence a 24% discount on all services. 
McKenzie subsequently petitioned the same insurance companies to be added as a 
preferred provider.22  When McKenzie petitioned for preferred provider status, 
PeaceHealth penalized Regence by adjusting the discount available to it to 15% if 
PeaceHealth remained the sole preferred provider for all services, but only offered it 
a 10% discount if it added McKenzie as a preferred provider for primary and sec-
ondary ACHS.23  Similarly, other insurance providers that added McKenzie to their 
PPP saw their discounts from PeaceHealth decrease.24  In effect, PeaceHealth was 
using its market power in tertiary care services to offer financial incentives to insur-
ance companies to keep PeaceHealth as its exclusive preferred provider for all 
services.
 In January 2002, McKenzie filed a complaint in the United States District Court 
for the District of Oregon alleging, among other things, that PeaceHealth’s attempt 
to monopolize the primary and secondary ACHS market violated section 2 of the 
15. Id. at 901.
16. Id. at 902.
17. Id.
18. Id. 
19. See id.
20. Id.  For example, if the parties have a contract establishing a 90% reimbursement rate, when a patient (a 
client of the insurance company) seeks hospital services, then the insurance company will receive a 10% 
discount from the market price of the particular hospital service.  Id.
21. Id. at 903.
22. Id.
23. See id.
24. Id.  Overall, insurers who maintained an exclusive PPP with PeaceHealth were given a greater percentage 
discount than insurers who purchased some ACHS from McKenzie.  Id.
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Sherman Act.25  Relying on the Third Circuit’s en banc decision in Lepage’s Inc. v. 
3M, the District Court provided the following jury instructions: “[b]undled price 
discounts may be anti-competitive if they are offered by a monopolist and substan-
tially foreclose portions of the market to a competitor who does not provide an 
equally diverse group of services and who therefore cannot make a comparable 
offer.”26
 On appeal, PeaceHealth objected to these instructions, arguing that they made 
bundled discounts illegal per se based purely on market structure.27  Specifically, 
PeaceHealth argued that the application of the LePage’s test would prohibit a com-
pany from offering a bundled discount simply because its competitor offered a less 
diverse scope of products.28  PeaceHealth suggested that a cost-based analysis of the 
discount was the correct basis by which to analyze a section 2 violation.29  It pro-
posed that the appropriate test was either (i) a modified application of the single 
product predatory pricing test established in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp. or (ii) the full attribution test set forth by the court in Ortho Diagnostic 
Systems, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc.30
 In Brooke Group, the United States Supreme Court held that single product pred-
atory pricing is exclusionary under section 2 of the Sherman Act when (i) a discounter 
prices below its production cost and (ii) the discounter is able to recoup its short term 
losses once the predation period has ended.31  Extending this reasoning to multiple 
product bundling, the Brooke Group analysis leads to the conclusion—or so 
PeaceHealth and the amici supporting PeaceHealth argue—that bundled discounts 
are exclusionary only where the price of the bundled products is less than the total 
cost of producing those products.32  PeaceHealth argued that this bright-line test has 
two benefits: protecting the competitive process and clarity.33  First, PeaceHealth 
asserted that antitrust laws were designed to protect the competitive process by en-
couraging aggressive competition.34  Pricing is the primary means of economic rivalry 
25. Civil Complaint at 3, McKenzie-Willamette Hosp. v. PeaceHealth, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16203, No. 
02-6032 (D. Or. Jan. 28, 2002).
26. Cascade Health Solutions, 502 F.3d at 909.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Opening Brief of Appellant PeaceHealth at 19–20, Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 502 F.3d 
895 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 05-35640) [hereinafter PeaceHealth Brief].
30. Id. at 47–48.
31. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222–24 (1993).  The 
predation period is the time period in which the defendant retains an artificially low price, enabling 
them to absorb market share from their competitors.  See id. at 222.
32. Cascade Health Solutions, 502 F.3d at 914; see also PeaceHealth Brief, supra note 29, at 48.
33. PeaceHealth Brief, supra note 29, at 49.
34. Id.
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and the basis for competition.35  Thus, it would be counterproductive to cap dis-
counts without proof that pricing was below cost.36  Second, a bright-line rule was 
preferable for clarity and administrative efficiency.37  PeaceHealth argued that be-
cause there was insufficient evidence that its services were priced below cost, 
McKenzie’s bundled discount claim would fail under the modified Brooke Group 
analysis.38
 Alternatively, PeaceHealth argued the court should apply the Ortho full attribu-
tion test.39  This test compares prices to production costs and attributes the discount 
of all products in the bundle to the competitive product(s).40  If the price of the com-
petitive product, with the bundled discount allocated exclusively to it, is below the 
product’s production cost for an equally efficient competitor, then the discount may 
be found exclusionary.41  Under the Ortho full attribution test, the plaintiff has the 
burden of proving that it is an equally efficient competitor.42  PeaceHealth argued 
that because McKenzie had not proven that it was an equally efficient competitor, 
PeaceHealth was absolved from liability under this test.43  
 In response, McKenzie asserted that the LePage’s market structure test was the 
correct analysis by which to measure the legality of bundled discounts.44  McKenzie 
argued that monopolists should not be allowed to bundle products, but rather their 
services should be sold on their individual merits.45  It contended that pricing incen-
tives should rest on sales volumes and not be conditioned on an exclusionary 
35. Id.; see also Ortho Diagnostics Sys., 920 F. Supp. at 465.
36. PeaceHealth Brief, supra note 29, at 49.
37. Id. at 49–50.  Regulating above cost prices is “beyond the practical ability of a judicial tribunal to 
control without courting intolerable risks of chilling legitimate price-cutting.”  Brooke Group, 509 U.S. 
at 223.
38. PeaceHealth Brief, supra note 29, at 50–51.
39. Id. at 51.
40. Id. at 48.  For example, suppose Company A produces products X & Y and Company B produces only 
product X.  Company A individually prices X at $4.00 and Y at $3.00, but the bundled discount when 
purchasing the products together is $6.00.  Under the discount attribution test, the $1.00 cost differential 
between purchasing the products individually as opposed to a bundle would be attributed to Product X 
only because it is the competitive product.
41. Cascade Health Solutions, 502 F.3d at 909.
42. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., 920 F.Supp. at 469.
43. PeaceHealth Brief, supra note 29, at 52–53.  Had the Ninth Circuit’s test with a hypothetical equally 
efficient rival been applied, then McKenzie would only have had to show that no competitor could 
compete with the discount, rather than showing that McKenzie specifically was unable to compete.  See 
Lambert, supra note 4, at 1734–35.
44. Combined Opening Brief and Answering Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross Appellant McKenzie-
Willamette Hospital at 53–56, Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 502 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(No. 02-06032) [hereinafter McKenzie Brief].
45. Id. at 54.
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relationship of preferred provider status.46  Thus, McKenzie asserted that this 
straight-forward, simplistic test would facilitate the competitive process by creating 
transparency in pricing and would avoid the exclusion of single-product competi-
tors.47
 McKenzie also contended that Brooke Group should not be the basis for any rule 
regarding bundled discounts because of the fundamental distinction between preda-
tory pricing of a single product and discounts of multiple products.48  McKenzie 
argued that Brooke Group was a narrow holding, tailored to below-cost pricing of a 
single product, and therefore did not encompass the practice of above-cost dis-
counting across multiple product lines.49  Additionally, McKenzie argued that even 
if the court were to apply a cost-based analysis, PeaceHealth’s discount should be 
held exclusionary.50  McKenzie asserted that it was a more efficient provider of pri-
mary and secondary care services than PeaceHealth.51  Therefore, it was excluded 
from the market for reasons related to anticompetitive behavior rather than its own 
inefficiencies.52
 The Ninth Circuit reviewed the jury instruction de novo.53  It rejected all three 
tests offered by the parties, and instead applied the discount attribution test.54  The 
court began its analysis by comparing bundled discounts to two related, yet distin-
guishable exclusionary practices: tying arrangements and single product predatory 
pricing.55  Like tying arrangements, bundled discounts are incentives for consumers 
to accept products in a group rather than individually.56  The court, however, distin-
guished the practice of tying, acknowledging that as a general practice bundled 
discounts provide an option—the consumer may purchase desired products as a group 
or purchase them individually.57  However, with tying the consumer is forced to ac-
46. See id. at 58.
47. Id. at 54.
48. See id. at 57; supra text accompanying notes 31–32.
49. See McKenzie Brief, supra note 44, at 56–57.
50. Id. at 56.
51. Cascade Health Solutions, 502 F.3d at 907.
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 909.
54. Id. at 914–16.
55. Id. at 910–11.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 911.
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cept all products with the discount.58  Thus, the court declined to apply the rules 
applicable to tying arrangements to bundled discounts.59
 The Ninth Circuit also rejected the single product predatory pricing analysis 
employed in Brooke Group because of the fundamental differences in the two types of 
discounts.60  In a single product predatory pricing analysis, the relevant relationship 
compares one price to one cost, whereas with bundled discounts the relevant com-
parison is one price to multiple product costs.61  The court recognized that it is 
possible for a bundled discounter to charge a price that is above production costs of 
the products, yet still excludes equally efficient competitors who produce fewer 
product lines.62  Thus, the traditional below-cost pricing standard articulated in 
Brooke Group could fail to indicate when a bundled discount is anticompetitive and 
exclusionary.63  For that reason, the court declined to use the Brooke Group test to 
evaluate bundled discounts.64
 The court did hold, however, that to determine if a discount was exclusionary 
under section 2 of the Sherman Act, the discount must resemble the behavior that 
the Supreme Court deemed predatory in Brooke Group, specifically preventing com-
petition on its merits.65  Thus, it refused to adopt a rule that found a discount 
exclusionary simply because the end result pushes rivals from the market.  Rather, it 
required an analysis of the means by which rivals were pushed from the market to 
determine whether the discounting behavior was exclusionary.66  The court held that 
58. Philip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust 
Principles and Their Application ¶ 749b, at 332 (2d. ed. Supp. 2006) (“[T]he traditional tying 
contract typically forces the buyer to accept both products, as well as the cost savings.”).
59. Cascade Health Solutions, 502 F.3d at 920.  McKenzie alleged a tying violation, which the court addressed 
in a separate part of the opinion.  Id. at 925.
60. See id. at 915–16.
61. See id. at 915.
62. See id. at 906–07; Ortho Diagnostic Sys., 920 F.Supp. at 467 (articulating the seminal hypothetical 
example of how a discounter can price a bundle of products above the cost of production and still 
exclude an equally efficient rival).  See generally Barry Nalebuff, Exclusionary Bundling, 50 Antitrust 
Bull. 321, 323–27 (2005) (illustrating how the pricing mechanism of bundled discounts can squeeze 
competitors from the market without engaging in the predatory pricing practices of selling the product 
below cost).
63. Cascade Health Solutions, 502 F.3d at 914.  The court concluded that, unlike predatory pricing where the 
above-cost discounts would not be considered exclusionary conduct, bundled discounts can be 
exclusionary when the discounts are above-cost because the depth of the discount can be spread across 
numerous products instead of a single product.  Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 913.  The court noted that the reasoning and conclusions in Brooke Group “show[ed] a measured 
concern to leave unhampered pricing practices that might benefit consumers, absent the clearest showing 
that an injury to the competitive process will result.”  Id.
66. Id. at 913–14.  Generally, pricing that is above the discounter’s cost but below the rival’s cost and/or the 
market level is permissive.  Id. at 911 (noting that as a general rule such behavior represents competition 
on its merits (citing Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 223)); see also id. at 906 (“[C]utting prices in order to 
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exclusionary conduct under section 2 of the Sherman Act occurs when “the discounts 
result in prices that are below an appropriate measure of the defendant’s cost.”67
 The court adopted the discount attribution test, a cost-based approach to deter-
mine if prices are below an appropriate measure.68  Like the Ortho full attribution 
test, the discount attribution test compares prices to production costs and attributes 
the entire discount of the bundle to the competitive product(s).69  However, the dis-
count will be found impermissible if a hypothetically efficient competitor is potentially 
excluded,70 as opposed to the Ortho full attribution test that requires the plaintiff to 
prove it is efficient.71  The court noted that this discount attribution standard had 
been utilized in two other Second Circuit cases, Information Resources, Inc.  v. Dun & 
Bradstreet Corp. and Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd. v. British Airways PLC.72 
Furthermore, the court relied upon the bipartisan Antitrust Modernization 
Committee 2007 Report endorsement of this standard.73  The AMC Report as-
serted that a plaintiff must prove that “after allocating all discounts and rebates 
attributable to the entire bundle of products to the competitive product, the defen-
dant sold the competitive product below its incremental cost for the competitive 
product.”74  The Ninth Circuit held that bundled discounts are exclusionary when, 
after allocating the discount to the competitive product, the plaintiff can show that 
the resulting price of the competitive product(s) is below the discounter’s incremental 
production cost.75  Thus, bundled discounts are an unfair pricing tactic only when 
they would exclude an equally efficient producer of the competitive product(s).76  
increase business often is the very essence of competition.” (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. 
at 594)).
67. Id. at 913–14.
68. Id. at 916.  In academic literature this test is also referred to, among other things, as the discount 
allocation standard.  Id. at 916 n.14.
69. Id.  For example, suppose Company A produces products X & Y and Company B produces only product 
X.  Company A individually prices X at $4.00 and Y at $3.00, but the bundled discount when purchasing 
the products together is $6.00.  Under the discount attribution test, the $1.00 cost differential between 
purchasing the products individually as opposed to a bundle would be attributed to Product X only 
because it is the competitive product.
70. Id. at 916–17; see, e.g., id. at 917 n.15.
71. Id. at 915.
72. Id. at 917–18 (“When price discounts in one market are bundled with the price charged in the second 
market, the discounts must be applied to the price in the second market in determining whether that 
price is below that product’s average variable cost.” (quoting Info. Res. Inc., v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 
359 F.Supp.2d 307, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2004))).
73. Cascade Health Solutions, 502 F.3d. at 918.  The Antitrust Modernization Committee was the product of 
a statute mandating bipartisan effort to review U.S. antitrust law and determine if it should be modified 
to ref lect modern trends.  Antitrust Modernization Comm’n, Report and Recommendations 
(2007) [hereinafter AMC Report]; see also Cascade Health Solutions, 502 F.3d. at 910 n.10.
74. Cascade Health Solutions, 502 F.3d. at 918 (quoting AMC Report, supra note 73, at 99).
75. Id. at 919.
76. Id.
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 Under Cascade Health Solutions all bundled discounts are evaluated using a cost-
based discount attribution test.77  In analyzing exclusionary conduct, the discount 
must be measured against the costs of a hypothetical equally efficient competitor.78 
Compared to the LePage’s market structure test, the discount attribution test narrows 
the scope of what would be considered an unfair bundling practice by looking be-
yond market structure and engaging in a price-cost analysis that underpins 
competition.79  This case comment contends that the discount attribution test is too 
broad in determining liability and will chill potentially competitive behavior.  A 
more appropriate test would find discounts presumptively legal and attribute the 
discount to the entire bundle. This case comment sets forth an alternative cost-based 
analysis called the aggregate test.  Instead of attributing the discount exclusively to 
the competitive product(s), the aggregate test may find discounts permissible if the 
total production cost is less than the price of the discount.
 The discount attribution test, like many initial tests analyzing competitive be-
haviors, too broadly condemns potentially pro-competitive behavior.80  Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act protects the competitive process.81  While the Ninth Circuit aims 
to protect this competitive process by ensuring an equally efficient competitor is not 
squeezed from the market,82 it does so at the expense of other competitive pro-
77. Id. at 916.  In academic literature this test is also referred to, among other things, as the discount 
allocation standard.  Id. at 916 n.4.
78. Id. at 916.
79. See id. at 913–14.
80. See Crane, supra note 6, at 427–28 (noting that courts initially imposed “draconian liability” on tying 
behavior that was usually benign, and they should learn from past mistakes and begin all Sherman Act 
analysis with an “inquiry into the reasons firms engage in that conduct”).  Similarly, the Supreme Court 
initially broadly condemned vertical price restraints (as they related to resale price maintenance).  See 
Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977) (holding that there was a per se 
prohibition against vertical price restraints, but non-price restraints should be subject to the rule of 
reason).  However, the Supreme Court has slowly chipped away at this broad condemnation.  See Leegin 
Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705, 2710 (2007) (holding that minimum price 
restraints are subject to the rule of reason); State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 22 (1997) (stating that 
minimum price restraints were subject to a per se prohibition, but maximum price restraints should be 
subject to the rule of reason because they could be found to benefit consumers and competition); see also 
Cascade Health Solutions, 502 F.3d at 918 (noting that this test sweeps more broadly than the aggregate 
discount rule or the actual plaintiff test that the Second Circuit articulated in Ortho Diagnostic 
Systems).
81. See Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. at 458 (“[The Sherman Act] is not to protect businesses from the working 
of the market; it is to protect the public from the failure of the market.  The law directs itself not against 
conduct which is competitive, even severely so, but against conduct which unfairly tends to destroy 
competition itself.”); see also Cascade Health Solutions, 502 F.3d at 912 (reinforcing that the objective of 
antitrust laws is to protect the process of competition rather than individual competitors).
82. See Cascade Health Solutions, 502 F.3d at 915–19 (distinguishing the discount attribution test from the 
full attribution test (articulated by the Second Circuit in Ortho Diagnostic Systems) and suggesting why 
the discount attribution test is better at addressing the need to protect equally efficient competitors); 
Lambert, supra note 4, at 1697.
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cesses.83  The discount attribution test ignores an integral component of competitive 
behavior—utilizing economies of scale and scope.84  
 By attributing the discount exclusively to the competitive product(s), the discount 
attribution test penalizes a company that is able to offer consumers a lower price be-
cause the company has reduced the total cost of its complete product array.85  The 
discount attribution test requires a cap on the amount of the discount equal to the 
difference between the competitive product’s cost and the competitive product’s 
price.86  It forces the common denominator to be an efficient producer of one product, 
rather than an efficient producer of multiple complimentary products.87  Though this 
test appropriately focuses on equally efficient competitors, it too narrowly focuses 
competition on one specific product rather than the total array of products.88 
Ultimately the discount attribution test prevents consumers from reaping the benefits 
of an expansive product offering by eliminating the incentive to offer a bundled dis-
count, and thus chilling competitive behavior.  
 The discount attribution test also directly contradicts Areeda and Hovenkamp’s 
leading treatise regarding package price discounts, a form of bundled discounts.89 
83. See Cascade Health Solutions, 502 F.3d at 906 n.6 (“[A] seller’s decision to offer such packages can merely 
be an attempt to compete effectively—conduct that is entirely consistent with the Sherman Act.” 
(quoting Jefferson Parrish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984))); Crane, supra note 6 
(discussing procompetitive rationale for bundled discounts).
84. See Cascade Health Solutions, 502 F.3d at 906 (explaining that bundled discounts benefit sellers because 
“it usually costs a firm less to sell multiple products to one customer at the same time than it does to sell 
the products individually”); AMC Report, supra note 73, at 95 (noting that the likely motivation for 
companies to offer bundled discounts is efficiencies, not schemes to acquire market power); Crane, supra 
note 6, at 430–33 (articulating the cost efficiencies to the discounter, including economies of scope, 
productive efficiencies and transactional cost efficiencies); Lambert, supra note 4, at 1736–37.
85. See generally Lambert, supra note 4, at 1736–37.  Lambert critiques multiple proposals relating to how 
courts, academics, and law makers evaluate bundled discounts.  One of the approaches he critiques is 
the proposal articulated in the leading treatise, Antitrust Law, addressing the “difficulties associated 
with Ortho Diagnostic’s evaluative approach.”  Id. at 1730.  The antitrust law approach critiqued by 
Lambert is similar to the discount attribution test adopted by the Ninth Circuit.
86. Id. at 1737.
87. Id.
88. See generally id. at 1738 (discussing tensions within treatises and case law surrounding predatory pricing 
and bundled discounts).
89. See 3A Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and 
Their Application ¶ 749c, at 313 (3d ed. 2006).  In discussing the general problem associated with 
package pricing Areeda and Hovenkamp note that
  courts should not entertain claims that, while a defendant’s overall price is remunerative, 
the separate “price” for one particular component in which it lacks monopoly power is 
unlawful.  Admitting such claims unreasonably restricts one of the most beneficial avenues 
along which firms compete . . . [specifically by] improving the quality of the product rather 
than cutting the price.
 Id.  However, in discussing the court’s decision in Cascade Health Solutions, the authors noted that while 
the decision was more sound than the LePage’s decision, a test determining the legality of bundled 
discounts “requires a showing of pricing below cost when all discounts are attributed to the excluded 
product, but only as a threshold.”  Id. ¶ 749d, at 338; see also Lambert, supra note 4, at 1733–36.
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The authors argue that the appropriate measure for package price analysis is to en-
sure that the total price of the package is greater than the total cost of producing the 
packaged products.90  The discount attribution test, however, forces one product (or 
group of products) to bear the burden of the discount. Arguably this prevents a com-
petitor who is equally efficient at producing the competitive product(s) from being 
forced out of the market.91  However, this test does not address the problem of bun-
dled discounts in terms of the objectives of the Sherman Act to determine if a 
discount is exclusionary and anticompetitive because it attempts to monopolize a 
competitive market.92  The discount attribution test fails to protect the consumer or 
the competitive process and forces a contrived market structure that discourages 
competitors from discounting and encourages them to cap discounts.93  
 A more appropriate test, the proposed aggregate test, would push prices towards 
cost while preventing prices from escalating once inefficient competitors have been 
driven from the market.94  The aggregate test reflects the presumptions set forth by 
Thomas A. Lambert in Evaluating Bundled Discounts,95 as well as the principles ar-
ticulated in Brooke Group.96  The aggregate test proposes that bundled discounts are 
presumptively legal so long as the aggregate price is greater than the aggregate cost. 
This presumption of legality could be rebutted if a plaintiff can prove there are (i) 
barriers to entry in the competitive market that allow the discounter to increase 
prices above a supracompetitive amount once the competitor has been eliminated 
from the market, and (ii) barriers to entry that prevent the plaintiff or other potential 
competitors from entering the market of the noncompetitive product(s).97
 Both the Cascade Health Solutions court and the Ortho Diagnostic Systems court 
rejected any test that aggregated the discount, because such a discount would allow 
90. See 3A Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 89, ¶ 749c, at 314; see also Lambert, supra note 4, at 1733 & 
n.187.
91. See Cascade Health Solutions, 502 F.3d at 915–19.
92. See Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. at 458; Cascade Health Solutions, 502 F.3d at 912..
93. See generally Lambert, supra note 4, at 1736–37.  The objective is to protect the consumer from the 
inefficiencies of the market.  Thus, capping discounts that would otherwise go to consumers is directly 
contrary to the purpose of pushing prices as close to cost as possible.
94. In this context an inefficient competitor is one that can not offer a similar discount because they do not 
offer as broad a scope of product, compared to an economic definition which determines efficiency on a 
product by product basis.
95. See Lambert, supra note 4, at 1739–56.
96. Cascade Health Solutions, 502 F.3d at 910–11 (citing Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 222).
97. Thomas Lambert’s proposal would require the plaintiff to also show (i) that they could not coordinate 
with other competitors to create the necessary bundle and (ii) that they could not become a supplier to 
the discounter.  Lambert, supra note 4, at 1742.  It was shown that McKenzie-Willamette Hospital did, 
in fact, attempt to coordinate with other competitors to offer a competitive bundle by merging with 
Cascade Health Solutions.  See supra text accompanying note 14.  However, as a practical matter, this 
places too much of a burden on the plaintiff to find a merger or cooperative solution with competitors 
that forces a contrived competitive landscape rather than a competitive landscape determined solely on 
the merits of a company’s competitive ability.
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above-cost pricing that had an anticompetitive effect.98  However, the United States 
Supreme Court has strongly cautioned against condemning above-cost discounts.99 
The aggregate test’s requirement that the plaintiff must overcome the presumption 
that the discounting practice is permissible100 heeds the Supreme Court’s caution, 
while still addressing the concerns of the second and ninth circuits’ concerns.101  The 
rebuttal qualification would prevent both the exclusion of competitive product ri-
vals102 and the manipulation of the market structure,103  thus ensuring that the 
competitive process is not undermined.  The application of an aggregate test would 
be significantly easier to administer than other tests, and would ensure the competi-
tive process is protected.
 A plaintiff can overcome the presumption of legality in the aggregate test by 
showing that barriers to market entry preclude all future competition.104  If the 
plaintiff were to show that the competitive product market had high barriers to entry, 
then the inference would be that few or no mechanisms were in place to prevent the 
discounter from increasing prices once the competitor had been forced from the mar-
ket.105  In contrast, if the plaintiff were unable to show significant market barriers, it 
could be argued that the impact on the competitive process (i.e., increased prices 
once competition has been squeezed out) would be minimized.106  With no or low 
barriers to entry, if a monopolist begins raising prices, rivals will enter the market 
and the resulting competition will force prices back below a supracompetitive level.107 
98. Cascade Health Solutions, 502 F.3d at 914; Ortho Diagnostic Sys., 920 F.Supp. at 469.
99. Cascde Health Solutions, 502 F.3d at 912; see also Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 223.  The court noted:
  As a general rule, the exclusionary effect of prices above a relevant measure of cost either 
ref lects the lower cost structure of the alleged predator, and so represents competition on 
the merits, or is beyond the practical ability of a judicial tribunal to control without 
courting intolerable risks of chilling legitimate price-cutting.
 Id.
100. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
101. See cases cited supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text.
102. See generally Cascade Health Solutions, 502 F.3d at 918–19 (noting that the discount attribution test’s 
objective is to prevent the exclusion of an equally efficient producer of the competitive product).
103. See id. at 908 (articulating the Third Circuit’s concern in LePage’s that by virtue of the market structure 
a monopolist’s behavior is unconstrained enables the elimination of rivals).
104. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
105. See Lambert, supra note 4, at 1745 (noting that the plaintiff should show that the product market in 
question is actually susceptible to monopolization).
106. See id. at 1744–45.  See generally Cascade Health Solutions, 502 F.3d at 910–11.  The opportunity to 
recoup losses was a consideration in Brooke Group when determining if a pricing scheme was exclusionary. 
Id.  The Ninth Circuit sought to address the competitive behavior concerns Brooke Group sought to 
protect and this test provides an analogous measure of the behaviors affecting competition for bundled 
discounts.  See supra text accompanying note 65; see also Ortho Diagnostic Sys., 920 F.Supp. at 466 
(acknowledging that sacrificing current profits for later gain is what “separates the competitive sheep 
from the anticompetitive goats”).
107. See Ortho Diagnostic Sys., 920 F.Supp. at 466.
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Thus, the aggregate test is more appropriate than other tests because it limits the 
scope of inquiry to whether an equally efficient competitor will be able to compete if 
the market were to become inefficient.
 The aggregate test also requires the plaintiff to show that there are high barriers 
to entry in the non-competitive product market.108  In cases where a monopolist con-
trols the non-competitive market, a two-fold inquiry is required.109  First, a court 
must examine why the plaintiff is prevented from entering the market and second 
must ask whether the discounter will ever face competition in the non-competitive 
market.110  Taken together, these inquiries identify when the discounter has the 
ability to abuse its monopoly power by permanently preventing competition across 
both the competitive and non-competitive product markets.111  
 The Sherman Act prohibits exclusionary practices.  Removing inefficient rivals is 
an acceptable competitive behavior, but removing rivals through exclusionary prac-
tices or brute force manipulation is prohibited by the Sherman Act.112  The appropriate 
test for evaluating bundled discounts should be narrowly tailored to prevent the un-
necessary condemnation of competitive pricing practices.  While some cost-based 
analysis is necessary, evaluating bundled discounts is complicated when the courts 
must analyze multiple products and product markets.  However, this complication 
should not disproportionately affect one product.113  Instead, the analysis should 
measure the total bundle of products sold to the consumer.  The aggregate test ad-
dresses the objectives of the Sherman Act and the Ninth Circuit.114  It prevents 
discounts that manipulate the market structure and avoids the overly broad condem-
nation of potentially competitive behavior of a discounter.115  The test permits 
discounts that benefit consumers and are the result of cost efficiencies and product 
variety.
108. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
109. See Lambert, supra note 4, at 1744–45.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1744 & n.225 (acknowledging that when capital markets are functioning properly investments will 
be made in any market capable of generating competitive returns).
112. See Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 223–26.  Antitrust law forbids a profitable/large company, capable of 
financially sustaining a loss for longer than its smaller rival, from engaging in pricing practices that will 
cause a short term loss in exchange for the ability to subsequently recoup any losses by raising the price 
above the level the market would normally endure.  Id.
113. See generally Lambert, supra note 4, at 1726 (discussing the shortcomings of discount attribution 
standards).
114. See supra notes 100–11 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 100–11 and accompanying text.
